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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
who owes them nothing, but should look only to property pur-
chased with community funds.
Problems involving credit sales to married women will
probably diminish in the future. In 1944, the Civil Code was
amended to provide that the revenues from the separate property
of the wife accrue to the community unless the wife registers a
document stating. her intent to maintain separate administra-
tion.24 Income from a wife's occupation, trade, or business also
falls into the community unless the husband and wife are living
separate and apart.25 Thus, a wife living with her husband who
has not filed a document indicating that she retains separate ad-
ministration of her property can obtain funds to meet payments
on separate property only by selling other property or by
inheritance or gift.
James M. Dozier, Jr.
LEGISLATION-LoUISIANA REVSED STATUTES OF 1950-EFFECT
The jurisprudence concerning the effect of the Louisiana
Revised Statutes of 1950 has two branches, emphasizing the two
significant characteristics of the revision.' The first group of
cases stands for the proposition that there is a presumption
against any intended change in the substance of prior statutes.
The second group of cases holds that since the prior statutes
which were revised have been repealed expressly,2 a source
statute may not be used to alter a clear provision of the Revised
Statutes. The purpose of thisnote is to discuss the basis of these
decisions.
One purpose in enacting the Revised Statutes was to re-
organize and to clarify the general statute law so as to simplify
its use without changing its substance. The Louisiana Law
Institute was directed by legislative act, "to prepare a compre-
hensive revision of the statutes of the State of a general charac-
ter, including those contained within the revision of 1870, to
24. Art. 2386, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870, as amended, La. Acts 1944, No. 286, p.
836.
25. Art. 2334, LA. CIVIL CODs of 1870; Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So.
37 (1933).
1. For a comprehensive discussion indicating the purpose and scope of
the Revised Statutes, see Bennett, Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, 11
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 4 (1950).
2. La. Acts 1950(1 E.S.), No. 2, § 2, printed in 5 LA. R.S. 870 (1950).
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simplify their language, to correct their incongruities, to supply
their deficiencies, to arrange them in order, the sections thereof
being numbered so as to provide for additions and amendments,
and to reduce them to one connected text with a view to their
adoption. . .. -3 The Law Institute adopted a conservative gen-
eral policy regarding the revision of existing laws.4 In a letter 5
from the Law Institute to the Governor accompanying the ,pro-
posed revision, it was stated that, "[w]hile the Institute believes
this revision has reduced the volume of the general statutory
law of this state by at least fifty percent, nothing has been done
which would change the present law." The statute enacting the
Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 announced in its title that
it was a revision and consolidation of the general and public
laws.6 Revised Statutes 1:16 provides the rule of construction
to be applied to the Revised Statutes: "The Louisiana Revised
Statutes of 1950 shall be construed as continuations of and as
substitutes for the laws or parts of laws which are revised and
consolidated herein."
Professor Bennett, a member of the Council of the Law
Institute and general coordinator of the revision work, has stated
the meaning of Section 16 in the following words: "This saving
clause, by expressly stipulating that the Revised Statutes 'shall
be construed as continuations of and as substitutes for' the
statutes incorporated therein, also serves to make it clear that
the provisions carried over into the revision are subject to the
same judicial interpretation which they were formerly accorded.
Thus the wealth of prior jurisprudence construing Louisiana's
general statutes is preserved."7 Adoption of this rule of con-
3. La. Acts 1942, No. 42, p. 136.
4. Policy statement adopted at May 1947 meeting of Law Institute
membership: "The Revision is not to be a mere compilation of existing laws.
Neither is it to embody policy changes in the substance of the law. Existing
laws are to be worked into a consistent and logical pattern. Obsolete pro-
visions are to be deleted, but only after a careful check as to any possible
utility. Incongruities are to be resolved, but only after a careful analysis
of the statutes involved and with a conscientious effort to effectuate the
true legislative intent. The Revision will attempt, in many instances, to
bring some semblance of order out of chaos; but it will not pattern that
order upon the Reporters' or Council's concept of what the substantive law
should be." Printed in 1 LA. R.S. xiii (1950).
5. Letter, Law Institute, Dec. 27, 1949.
6. La. Acts 1950, No. 2, § 1, printed in 1 LA. R.S. 2 (1950): "An Act, to
revise the laws of the State of Louisiana of a general or public nature and
to consolidate them into a system of laws to be known as the Louisiana
Revised Statutes of 1950; to enact the necessary legislation in connection
therewith; to provide for the continuous revision of the laws; and to repeal
certain enumerated statutes."
7. Bennett, Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, 11 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
4, 7 (1950).
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struction concerning the effects of a revision is common in other
states.8 "A statute incorporated into a code is presumed to be
incorporated without change even though it is reworded and
rephrased and in the organization of the code its original sections
are separated."10
Consistent with this presumption against change, the Loui-
siana courts have held that an article of the Criminal Code, which
was specifically repealed by Section 2 of the Revised Statutes
and re-enacted bodily in Title 14, continued its operation without
interruption;1 ' that the time limit for filing an application for
rehearing provided by a prior statute (fourteen days after notice
of judgment received by counsel) was not changed by the pro-
vision's being reworded in the Revised Statutes (fourteen days
after rendition of judgment);12 that the omission in the Revised
Statutes of qualifying words found in a prior statute did not
effect a change, the qualification being made clear by new lan-
guage; 13 that incorporation of a rule of venue formerly applicable
only to foreign corporations into the Revised Statutes did not
make the old rule applicable to domestic corporations, even
though the new provision, appearing out of its old context, could
have been interpreted differently. 14
The second purpose of the revision was to resolve the am-
biguities and uncertainties arising from overlapping and con-
flicting statutes. To accomplish this end, a careful analysis of
the prior statutes was made before writing the new provisions.
After this was done, all the statutes which had been revised and
consolidated were repealed. Thus, the Revised Statutes stand as
the new law, supplanting all of the source statutes. The impli-
cations of this repeal become important when considered with
the first purpose of the revision. The provisions of the Revised
Statutes were intended as continuations of and substitutes for
8. A contrary rule is commonly applied to amendatory acts when no
general revision is involved. "Therefore, any material change in the lan-
guage of the original act is presumed to indicate a change in legal rights."
1 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 412 (3d ed., Horack, 1943).
9. "A revision of previously enacted legislation with the elimination of
repealed laws, the inclusion of proper amendments, and the systematic
arrangement of the laws by subject matter when enacted by the legislature
becomes an official code." 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 250 (3d ed.,
Horack, 1943).
10. Id. at 255, and cases there cited.
11. State v. Mathe, 219 La. 661, 53 So.2d 802 (1951).
12. Newsom v. Caldwell & McCann, 51 So.2d 393 (La. App. 1951).
13. State v. Rones, 223 La. 839, 67 So.2d 99 (1953).
14. Perkins v. Brothers of Christian Schools of Lafayette, Inc., 71 So.2d
400 (La. App. 1954).
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the incorporated statutes. Whenever there is direct and un-
equivocal conflict between an existing provision and a prior law,
however, the existing provision must prevail, because the prior
one has been repealed. 5 Following this principle, the courts
have held that a conflict between a prior statutory delegation of
authority to municipalities of certain populations to define gamb-
ling, and the Revised Statutes, which provided no such delega-
tion, must be resolved in favor of the Revised Statutes; 16 that all
sections of the Revised Statutes must be given effect, if at all
possible, without regard to the date of enactment of the respec-
tive source provisions thereof; 7 and that the possibility that a
prior statute which was unconstitutional because the act was
broader than its title does not affect the validity of like provisions
enacted into the Revised Statutes;' s and that where one statute
had repealed another statute before enactment of the Revised
Statutes, but both statutes were included in the Revised Statutes,
both provisions were of equal dignity.' 9 The Supreme Courf has
been criticized for failing to follow this rule of construction in
only one case.2°
At first blush the two principles underlying the revision
might seem inconsistent. They are readily reconcilable, however,
when the nature and purposes of the revision are considered.
On the one hand, the general benefits of prior jurisprudence are
still available and no presumption of change is indulged. On the
other, the Revised Statutes is the law, and not mere prima facie
evidence thereof, and the provisions of repealed prior statutes
may not be used to contradict the existing provisions. It is
15. In order to rectify any inadvertent errors or omissions in the new
Revised Statutes, the Louisiana Law Institute sponsored a general erratum
bill in the 1952 session of the legislature. It was enacted as La. Acts 1952,
No. 127, p. 303.
16. City of Alexandria v. Lacombe, 220 La. 618, 57 So.2d 206 (1952).
17. Chappuis v. Reggie, 222 La. 35, 62 So.2d 92 (1952); Babineaux v.
Lacobie, 222 La. 45, 62 So.2d 95 (1952); State ex rel. Fudickar v. Heard, 223
La. 127, 65 So.2d 112 (1953); State ex rel. Fudickar v. Norris, 223 La. 135, 65
So.2d 115 (1953).
18. State v. Rones, 223 La. 839, 67 So.2d 99 (1953).
19. Guillot v. Nunez, 225 La. 301, 72 So.2d 513 (1954). This case would
have resolved itself into an interpretation of two conflicting provisions of
the Revised Statutes, if one of the provisions had not been amended shortly
after enactment of the Revised Statutes, and the legislative intent thus made
clear.
20. Gabriel v. United Theatres, 221 La. 219, 59 So.2d 127 (1952). See The
Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 Term-Civil Pro-
cedure, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 306, 323 (1953); Note, 13 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEw 518, 521 (1953). A possible explanation of the Gabriel case may be
that the inclusion of the provision in question in the Revised Statutes appar-
ently was not brought to the court's attention.
1955]
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submitted that the Louisiana courts, with the one exception
noted, have implemented the true purposes of the Revised
Statutes by their decisions.
John S. White, Jr.
LOUISIANA PRACTICE-ISSUANCE OF WRITS OF INJUNCTION-
VALIDITY OF LEGISLATIVE LIMITATIONS
UPON THE COURTS
Plaintiff employer brought suit against twenty-one named
defendants individually, and as officers, agents, and members of
a union to restrain them from trespassing on or damaging its
properties, or from pursuing any course involving the intimi-
dation, molesting, threatening, or abuse of petitioner's officers,
agents, employees, or customers. The court sustained defen-
dants' exceptions of prematurity and no cause of action because
plaintiff had not complied with the requirements of the Louisi-
ana "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act" of 1934.1 The Supreme Court
granted writs to review the trial judge's ruling. Held, excep-
tions overruled. A statute such as Act 203 of 1934 which limits
the jurisdiction of courts in granting immediate injunctive relief
when necessary for the protection of rights and property is
"illegal and ineffective." Douglas Public Service Corp. v. Gas-
pard, 74 So.2d 182 (La. 1954).3
1. LA. R.S. 23:841-849 (1950). In the declaration of public policy con-
tained in Section 843 the reasons for limiting the issuance of injunctions in
cases arising out of labor disputes are clearly stated: "Legal procedure
that permits a complaining party to obtain sweeping injunctive relief that
is not preceded by or conditioned upon notice to and hearing of the re-
sponding party or parties . . . is peculiarly subject to abuse in labor liti-
gation ......
Two of the most important provisions are Sections 841 and 844. Sec-
tion 841 prohibits the issuance of any restraining order or temporary or
permanent injunction to prohibit such things as becoming or remaining a
member of a labor union or peaceful picketing, etc. Section 844 prohibits
the issuance of temporary or permanent injunctions in labor disputes
except after hearing testimony of witnesses in open court, with opportunity
for cross-examination, etc., and except after such findings of fact to the
effect that unlawful acts have been threatened or committed, and that
"substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property will follow
unless the relief requested is granted," etc. In no instance will a temporary
restraining order be granted unless at least 48 hours' notice is given.
2. The court did not, in so many words, declare any portion of the act
unconstitutional. In fact, the opinion does not make it clear whether or not
the constitutional issue was raised at all, by either party to the suit.
3. For a discussion of the due process aspect and other ramifications
involved in the case, see The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1958-1954 Term-Constitutional Law, 15 LouISIANA REVIEw 321 (1955).
